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Abstract
Several scholars have attributed high hopes to social media regarding their alleged ability to enable a nonhierarchical and
freely accessible debate among the citizenship (Loader & Mercea, 2011; Shirky, 2011). Those hopes have culminated in
theses such those describing the social web as being a ‘new public sphere’ (Castells, 2009, p. 125) as well as in expectations
regarding its revitalizing potential for the ‘Habermas’s public sphere’ (Kruse, Norris, & Flinchum, 2018, p. 62). Yet, these
assumptions are not uncontested, particularly in the light of socially mediated populism (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018).
Interestingly, research on populism in the social web is still an exception. The same is true for the populist permeation
of the social media discourse on migration, as a highly topical issue. This study seeks to elaborate on this research gap
by examining to what extent the Twitter debate on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM)
was permeated by populist content. For this purpose, almost 70,000 tweets on the most important Hashtags referring to
the GCM that took place in Marrakesh in December 2018 were collected and the 500 widest-reaching tweets analysed in
terms of their populist permeation. Against initial expectations, the empirical findings show that populist narratives did
not dominate the Twitter debate on migration. However, the empirical results indicate that ordinary citizens play an im-
portant role in the creation and dissemination of populist content. It seems that the social web widens the public sphere,
including those actors who do not communicate in accordance with the Habermasian conceptualization of it.
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1. Introduction
It is widely assumed that social media has become
an integral part of the public sphere (Castells, 2009;
Papacharissi, 2009; Shirky, 2011). Castells (2009, p. 125),
as one of the most prominent proponents of a network
society, even speaks of the emergence of a ‘new pub-
lic sphere.’ However, there are also critical voices (Kruse,
Norris, & Flinchum, 2018) stating that citizens do not en-
gage on social media in a way that matches the well-
known criteria from the concept of ‘communicative ratio-
nality’ as established by Habermas (1984, 1989). Already
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers were
able to demonstrate that illiberal voices were more vis-
ible on the Internet than liberal ones (Hill & Hughes,
1998, p. 153) and hypothesized that the “growth of vir-
tual counter-public spheres” (Downey & Fenton, 2003,
p. 199) would lead to an increasing impact of rightist
actors on the public debate. This article intends to con-
tribute to the long-running discussion on the influence
of digital media on the public sphere by analysing the
populist permeation of social media discourse on migra-
tion. The focus on populism andmigration seems reason-
able since populist communication strategies have to be
seen as the exact opposite of the Habermasian ideal of
communicative rationality and thus as a challenge for the
public sphere (Privitera, 2018). The populist challenge is
especially noticeable in the public debate on migration,
which has recently become a major issue (Heidenreich,
Eberl, Lind, & Boomgaarden, 2020, p. 1261). While there
are studies on the degree of populist pervasion of mass
media (Rooduijn, 2014), as well as on the mass media
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coverage of migration (Eberl et al., 2018) and the social
media discourse on migration (Heidenreich et al., 2020),
no research concerning social media, populism, and mi-
gration has been conducted so far.
The main empirical objective of this article is to form
a better understand the characteristic of the populist
discourse concerning migration on social media. For the
purpose of this article, the global Twitter discourse on
the intergovernmental signing conference of the Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM)
in Marrakesh in December 2018 will be examined. This
study will focus on Twitter due to its significance for the
agendas of the mass media and thereby for the wider
perception of political issues. It has been shown that
mainstream news media frequently respond to trending
topics on Twitter (Araujo & van der Meer, 2020, p. 634),
which can be observed especially well concerning the
mass media coverage of tweets by the US American
President Donald Trump (Fuchs, 2017, pp. 53–54). The
usage of Twitter as a source for news media is very com-
mon among journalists. One might even speak of “a re-
versed agenda-setting pattern” (Araujo & van der Meer,
2020, p. 647). Thus, debates on Twitter influence the pub-
lic debate outside the Twitter realm.
The following questions will guide the investigation:
(RQ1) how strongly was the Twitter discourse on migra-
tion permeated with populist content during the sign-
ing conference on the GCM? Since this article deals with
migration, in other words, with the core issue of right-
wing populist actors (Jagers & Walgraave, 2007, p. 322;
Lutz, 2018, p. 517), this article is especially interested in
the number of right-wing populist tweets. If it emerges
that there were (right-wing) populist tweets, the fol-
lowing question arise: (RQ2) which populist communica-
tion strategies were employed? Thus, this study sheds
light on the degree of populist content in the online dis-
course regarding migration (content dimension: What is
published?) and about populist communication strate-
gies (strategic dimension: How is populist content pub-
lished?). It needs to be stressed that this article is not
solely interested in social media activities of political ac-
tors who are well-known for their populist attitude, but
also in those of ‘ordinary’ citizens since their populist ac-
tivities also have to be examined if one wants to fully un-
derstand populism on social media. Moreover, the con-
cept of the public sphere requires the “equal and pro-
tected participation” (Kruse et al., 2018, p. 63) in pub-
lic debates. Since social media is credited with free ac-
cess and a non-hierarchical structure of debate, it seems
to match those key features of the Habermas’s public
sphere. Even though the focus of this article is on social
media and populism, it aims to make an empirical con-
tribution to the primarily theoretic debate on the pub-
lic sphere.
In Section 2, a brief explanation of the GCM is pre-
sented. The following part of the article intends to
present a conceptualisation of the term ‘populism,’ as
well as an overview of the current state of research on
populism and social media. A specific focus is placed
on the role of non-elite actors in the realm of populism
since this aspect has been widely neglected by academic
research. Before the empirical part of the study is de-
scribed in detail (Section 5), I will give an insight into the
research design of this article and itsmethods (Section 4).
The article concludes with a summary of the main find-
ings and an indication of further aspects to be examined
(Section 6).
2. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular
Migration
The GCM is seen as an extremely important compact
in the realm of international migration policy since it
is the “first negotiated United Nations document to ad-
dress migration governance comprehensively and to re-
ceive wide support” (Bloom, 2019, p. 481). The GCM is
the result of a UN Resolution—the so-called New York
Declaration of 2016 (United Nations Human Rights,
2016). This declaration places the GCM in the wider con-
text of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. The New York Declaration launches a se-
quence of intergovernmental consultations and negoti-
ations towards the development of a GCM. This subse-
quent process concluded with the adoption of the GCM
by 164 UN member states at a signing conference in
Morocco. The formal endorsement by the UN General
Assembly took place on December 19th (International
Organisation for Migration, 2019). The agenda, as well
as the compact, stresses the potential of migration for
enriching the societies of the recipient countries. The
main objective of the GCM is the reduction of risk
and vulnerability during the migration process by es-
tablishing an international framework. The final version
of the GCM includes several mentions of the state’s
human rights obligations concerning migrants (Guild,
Basaran, & Allinson, 2019; United Nations, 2020). The
closing statement of the signing conference by Louis
Arbor (Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for International Migration) includes the notion that the
GCM has to be seen as “a re-affirmation of the val-
ues and principles embodied in the UN Charter” and as
a commitment “to safer and fairer ways of managing
borders” (United Nations, 2018). Although the GCM is
not legally binding, and although the principle of state
sovereignty remains unaffected (Bloom, 2019, p. 482), its
adoption was preceded and accompanied by an exten-
sive and mostly adversarial debate in several countries
which even lead to some governments to refuse to sign it
(e.g., US, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy). The US govern-
ment, for example, rejected signing the GCM with refer-
ence to its right to decide “how to secure its borders, and
whom to admit for legal residency” (US Mission to the
United Nations, 2018). Other governments made a simi-
lar argument. The potential loss of sovereignty seems to
have influenced the debate, although the compact in its
own right has given no cause for this fear.
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3. Populism and Social Media
Despite the frequently mentioned ambiguity in terms of
the populism concept (Müller, 2016, p. 2), one finds cen-
tral elements that have been part of most definitions
of the concept. One of the oldest, though most impor-
tant elements of populism, is the “reference to an ana-
logical basis which is the people” (Laclau, 1979, p. 165).
The appeal to ‘the people’ as a very basic aspect of pop-
ulism confronts researcher with the problem that ‘the
people’ “is a concept without a defined theoretical sta-
tus” (Laclau, 1979, p. 165). This might be one reason for
the “ambiguity surrounding ‘populism”’ (Laclau, 1979,
p. 165). Bearing this in mind, a meaningful conceptu-
alization of populism, as a prerequisite for a valid op-
erationalization (see Section 4), needs additional defini-
tion criteria. Thus, almost all conceptualizations of pop-
ulism contain anti-elitism as a second very basic crite-
rion. Anti-elitism is, in the words of Canovan (1999, p. 3),
“directed not just at the political and economic estab-
lishments but also opinion-formers in the academy and
the media.” It seems important to understand that “pop-
ulism challenges not only established power-holders but
also elite values” (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). Mudde (2004,
p. 543) sums up the aforementioned conceptualization
fragments well when he states that populism “consid-
ers society to be ultimately separated into two homo-
geneous and antagonistic groups” and in which the so-
called pure people are exploited by a corrupt elite. Thus,
populists prefer politics to be “an expression of the
volonté générale (general will) of the people.” The last
aspect refers to the alleged goal of populists, namely to
ensure that the will of the people is enacted against the
resistance of the so-called elite. Analysing the recent aca-
demic debate on populism, it seems fair to conclude that
the aforementioned core elements of the long-standing
discussion about a useful conceptualization of the term
populism—people-centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring
the sovereignty of the (good) people—are more or less
consensual (Meléndez&Kaltwasser, 2019, p. 520). Those
elements point out that “populist politics is not ordinary,
routine politics,” but politics with an “extra emotional
ingredient,” that “can turn politics into a campaign to
save the country or to bring about a great renewal,” as
Canovan (1999, p. 6) put it. Right-wing populism can
be understood as a specific characteristic of populism
(Krämer, 2017, p. 1295). One of its special characteristics
is its strong emphasis on ‘the others’ (Bobba, 2019, p. 16).
This aspect refers to groups other than the elites who
are suspected of endangering “people’s values, identities
and rights” (Bobba, 2019, p. 13), namely to “different eth-
nicities, cultures, or nations” (Krämer, 2017, p. 1296).
Most of the research on populism has been con-
ducted in terms of traditional mass media. Academic
research on populism and mass media has revealed,
among other things, an “affinity between a populist
communication style and ‘media logic”’ (Sorensen, 2018,
p. 2). Interestingly the same seems to hold for populism
and the logic of social media. Bartlett (2014, p. 106) con-
siders that populist actors would profit from the preva-
lence of said new digital media since their inherent logic
would match perfectly with their communication style.
There is plenty of research on the logic of social me-
dia, from which we know that “emotional, controversial,
even violent content typical of much populist activism”
(Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018, p. 3) is shared by users of
those social networking sitesmuchmore frequently than
messages with a balanced expression of opinion. This is
why populistmessages frequently have such a resonance
on social media (Bobba, 2019, p. 11). Due to the horizon-
tal network architecture of Twitter and other social me-
dia tools, messages can spread to huge publics: “In the
context of Twitter, a handful of hops in a retweet chain is
enough to reach a substantial audience and saturation is
usually reached within one day” (Araujo & van der Meer,
2020, p. 636).
As journalists are especially interested in trending
topics, populist news on social media is very likely to
spill over in the traditional media system and thereby ex-
tend the reach of a tweet dramatically. Moreover, pop-
ulist tweets often contain a higher news value, since
journalist tend to select negative and sensational con-
tent, which has been well described by the theory of
news selection (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Lippmann, 1922;
Östgaard, 1965). The key news factors, described in the
theory of news values, also seem to be an important se-
lection criterion for the public, as Araujo and van der
Meer (2020, p. 637) put it with reference to Eilders
(2006). Thus, populist messages on Twitter and other
social media platforms are very likely to be exported
and noticed beyond the boundaries of their origin (van
Dijck & Poell, 2013). Araujo and van der Meer (2020,
p. 647) witness a dynamic interplay between Twitter and
traditional media. The connection between traditional
media and digital media was prominently described by
Chadwick (2017) who named this new communication
eco-system a ‘hybrid media system.’ Especially “‘elite’
populist actors” (Krämer, 2017, p. 1294), such as politi-
cal parties, know about the different media logics and
the connection between the traditional and the newme-
dia and apply a populist communication style, not only
because it matches their worldview, but also strategi-
cally to spread their messages on social media and tra-
ditional media. This strategy comes as no surprise, since
populist actors, as Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018, p. 3)
put it, “have everywhere constantly relied on the visibil-
ity and the ensuing popularity assured by the coverage,
both critical and supportive, of mainstream and popular
media.” It should be noted that social media is used by
populist actors to “bypass the forceful power ofmassme-
dia” (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018, p. 3), as well as to in-
fluence their agenda (Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, &
Franch, 2017, p. 689).
The majority of the studies in the field of social
media and populism deal with the communication of
well-known populist politicians and political parties and
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 73–83 75
in particular with right-wing populist actors (Arzheimer,
2015; Engesser, Ernst, Esser, &Büchel, 2016;Mazzoleni &
Bracciale, 2018; Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017).
This focus is quite reasonable since the usage of populist
communication strategies is most obvious in the con-
text of professional politicians who are known for their
populist attitude, such as Matteo Salvini from the right-
ist Italian party Lega Nord (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018,
p. 4). Right-wing politicians are particularly successful
on social media, as several authors, including Bobba
(2019)with regard to Italy, demonstrates. Ernst, Engesser,
Büchel, Blassnig, and Esser (2017, p. 1356), have further-
more shown that “politicians belonging to right parties
use populist communication strategies most frequently”
(see also Jagers & Walgraave, 2007). Besides research
on “‘elite’ populist actors” (Krämer, 2017, p. 1294), only
minor attention has been given to “non–elite actors”
(Krämer, 2017, p. 1294). Yet, most of the social media
users are just average citizens. To the best of the au-
thors’ knowledge, so far only Hameleers and Schmuck
(2017, p. 1425) distinguish “between populist politicians
and ordinary citizens as communicators of populist mes-
sages” in an empirical article. The authors (Hameleers
& Schmuck, 2017, p. 1428) examine the effects of pop-
ulist social media messages on the attitude of Austrians
and Netherlanders in terms of blaming the government
and migrants. A distinction is made between the effects
of politicians’ messages and messages from ordinary cit-
izens. The authors are able to demonstrate that par-
ticipants of the study who identify with the sender of
a populist message, accept this message and become
themselves more populist (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017,
p. 1437). This finding is true for messages from politi-
cians and ordinary citizens, which clearly indicates that
theoretical as well as empirical knowledge on populist
online activism of ordinary citizens is necessary in order
to fully understand the populist penetration of today’s
(virtual) public sphere (Krämer, 2017, p. 1296). The need
to fill this research gap has become even more urgent
since the finding of Taggart (2018, p. 81), who demon-
strates that a populist attitude is a potentially facilitating
factor for many forms of political engagement. Anduiza,
Guinjoan, and Rico (2019, p. 110) state that it is not
distrust and frustration (Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2019,
p. 521) nor the feeling of being humiliated by the elites
(Eberl & Seubert, 2017, pp. 4–5), but it is the framing of
elites as evil forces that political engagement thrives on.
Engagement against the hideous elite thus may become
a moral imperative. Furthermore, it is plausible that the
populist idea of a political system in which the people
should express their will directly exerts a positive effect
on the political engagement of the bearer of this idea.
Consequently, populist attitudes seem not to facilitate
conventional modes of political participation, like vot-
ing, but more direct forms, “such as petition signing and
the online expression of political views” (Anduiza et al.,
2019, p. 109). These findings indicate that citizens with a
populist identity are particularly active in non-electoral
times, which has also been shown to be true by Pirro
and Portos (2020). Since Facebook, Twitter, and all the
other newly emerged tools are easy-to-use, with cheap
andwide-reaching information and communication tech-
nologies, they have to be seen as perfect instruments for
professional and non-professional actors with a populist
attitude to disseminate their political positions.
The findings presented so far indicate that the social
web is far from being able to match the Habermasian cri-
teria of communicative rationality. However, there are
strong—albeit mostly theoretical—voices that speak in
favour of the social web, as the new realm in which a
nonhierarchical and truth-seeking discourse might take
place (Loader &Mercea, 2011; Shirky, 2011). The debate
on the deliberative potential of social media has not yet
been finalized. Section 5 will shed some more light on
this debate by examining the Twitter discussion onmigra-
tion regarding its populist permeation. Before, an insight
into the research design and methodology is given.
4. Research Design and Methodology
4.1. Sample
For the analysis, almost 70,000 tweets (including meta-
data, such as the sender’s information) on the ten most
important transnational hashtags on migration were
mined (N = 69,153). The following hashtags have been
streamed, using the R package streamR which simplifies
access to the Twitter application programming interface
(Barberá, 2018): #GlobalCompactMigration, #Global
Compact, #UNMigrantCompact, #GCM, #Migration
Compact, #CompactOnMigration, #Marrakesh
Declaration, #ImmigrationPact, #MassMigration, and
#MigrationPact. The data collection phase for Twitter
communication on migration lasted for two weeks from
December 5th, 2018 to December 19th, 2018, covering
the period before the signing conference of the GCM in
Marrakesh took place and the days following the confer-
ence. Since several tweets were simply re-tweets with
(exactly) the same content, only the widest-reaching
doublets were kept. Thus, the sample was reduced to
14,566 tweets.
4.2. Measuring the Populist Permeation of the Twitter
Discourse
Since populism has to be seen as a complex construct,
automated methods should not be used for coding the
populist content of a tweet. Thus, most empirical stud-
ies on social media and populism work with manual cod-
ing (Ernst et al., 2017). This article will follow in these
(methodological) footsteps. As it is hardly feasible to
code each tweet on migration, an indicator is needed
to identify the level of populism in the Twitter debate
on migration: the populist permeation of the 500 most
popular tweets in the sub-sample of 14,566 tweets. The
popularity of a tweet is measured by its number of re-
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tweets and appreciations (so-called ‘favoritings’). The
share of tweets that can be classified as populist will be
investigated (RQ1). If it emerges that there are populist
tweets, the question arises: Which populist communi-
cation strategies have been used (RQ2). In addition, an
automatically conducted word pair analysis of the ini-
tial sample of almost 70,000 tweets will be applied to
check the validity of the results from the manual cod-
ing procedure.
To classify populist tweets, a content analysis cod-
ing schema is used that was established by Ernst et al.
(2017). See Table 1 in the Supplementary File for this ar-
ticle, which is available online. The schema consists of
nine sub-categories of populism or rather communica-
tion strategies, which represent the three core dimen-
sions of populism: (1) anti-elitism, (2) people-centrism
and (3) restoring the sovereignty of the people. Due to
the article’s special interest in the occurrence of right-
wing populism in the context of the migration debate
on Twitter, an anti-migration dimension is added to the
coding schema that consists of a modified set of the
anti-elitist sub-categories. By using that schema, one or
more than one sub-dimension of populism can be as-
signed to each tweet (unit of analysis). Since the exis-
tence of a single dimension hardly indicates that any par-
ticular tweet is populist, only those tweets that contain
at least one communication strategy from at least two
of the three core dimensions of populism (anti-elitism,
people-centrism, restoring the sovereignty of the peo-
ple) are coded as populist, furthermore, tweets need
to additionally contain at least one anti-migration state-
ment to be coded as right-wing populist. Figure 1 illus-
trates the coding approach. The first statement is coded
as an anti-elitist statement, since it calls the Irish gov-
ernment treacherous (discrediting the elite) and the sec-
ond statement as people-centrist, as it states a mono-
lithic people and stresses the people’s virtues. Because
there are only two populist dimensions in this tweet, it
is coded as a populist one, but not as a right-wing pop-
ulist one due to the lack of an anti-migration statement.
It should be noted that the codingwas only conducted by
one coder. This surely has to be seen as a methodologi-
cal shortcoming.
4.3. Bot or Not
In the academic, as well as in the public debate the ac-
tivities and the influence of fake profiles on Twitter are
subject of controversial debate. This is why many aca-
demic researchers use bot detection applications. Yet,
frequently used programs to detect bots have recently
been criticised by Twitter for their “extremely limited ap-
proach” (Roth & Pickles, 2020), which may cause “false
negatives (i.e., bots being classified as humans) and
false positives (i.e., humans being classified as bots),”
as Rauchfleisch and Kaiser (2020, p. 1) put it. With re-
gard to inauthentic content from human Twitter users
(e.g., state-driven trolls), the situation becomes even
more complex. Yet, there is recent research indicating
that “that their effect on social platforms was minor”
(Zannettou et al., 2019, p. 218). Interestingly, journal-
ists, who are very important disseminators of Twitter
content, seem unfamiliar with ‘fact-checking and verifi-
cation services’—despite the controversies on the mali-
cious use of automation on Twitter and the alleged influ-
ence of trolls. The same seems to be true for the public
(Varol & Uluturk, 2020, p. 98). It would seem to follow
that neither the majority of professional opinion-makers
nor its recipients distinguish between authentic and in-
authentic content on Twitter. This comes as no surprise
since it is actually not that easy to distinguish between
authentic and inauthentic activity. Taking all the above
arguments into account, an examination of tweets re-
garding their authenticity (was this particular tweet cre-
ated by a bot, a troll or an authentic user?) is not con-
ducted. However, it needs to be stressed that the empiri-
cal results of this study potentially might have been influ-
enced by inauthentic content. This has to be taken into
account when reading the following section.
5. Empirical Findings: The Populist Permeation of the
Twitter Dialogue on Migration
First of all, it is interesting to note that all of the 500
widest-reaching tweets are re-tweets. Most of them re-
fer to professional political actors. Yet, only 12 tweets
match the applied operationalization of a populist tweet
(2.40 percent) and only two the conceptualization of
right-wing populism. Additionally, it should be noted that
their reach has to be considered as rather low since
only one of those tweets initiated more than 1,000 re-
tweets and favoritings (see Table 2 and Table 3 in the
Supplementary File). Nevertheless, it is interesting to
note that 10 of those 14 (right-wing) populist tweets
contain at least one anti-elitist and one people-centrist
statement. This indicates that anti-elitism and people-
Figure 1. Coding of a tweet: Example for the coding approach. Source: Murphy (2018).
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centrism is the most frequently used populist combi-
nation in the discourse on migration. Furthermore, we
found both dimensions occur most frequently (Figure 2),
yet, in most cases not combined. This finding supports
the classical conceptualization of populism, inwhich anti-
elitism and people-centrism have been seen as the two
very basic elements of populism (Canovan, 1999; Laclau,
1979). By taking a closer look at the anti-elitist dimension,
one finds that blaming and discrediting elites occur the
most. Regarding the people-centrist dimension, stating
the existence of a monolithic people has to be seen as
the most prominent communication strategy.
A prominent example of a populist tweet is one cre-
ated by the leader of the UK Independence Party in
Wales stating that “any politician who willingly signs
up to the #MigrationCompact has betrayed their peo-
ple” (Shelly, 2018). This tweet contains the two core
elements of populism: anti-elitism (all politicians that
sign the GCM are fraudsters) and people-centrism (the
people will be betrayed). The description of elites as
being treasonous to the people, who are described as
sharing common feelings, desires and opinions on the
GCM seems to be a popular strategy of populist ac-
tors in the realm of the Twitter debate on the GCM
since this accusation can be found in several other
populist tweets. There is talk about, e.g., the “trea-
sonous…Government” (O’Neill, 2018), government act-
ing “is against its own people” (Martin, 2018), “High
Treason against” (Walters, 2018) the people, betrayal of
“our children” (Sabhat28, 2018), or the people who are
united by their rejection of the GCM (see Table 2 and
Table 3 in the Supplementary File).
Furthermore, some Twitter users allege “a conspir-
acy of silence” (Gormally, 2018) of the “corporate me-
dia” (O’Neill, 2018) and politics and as being “on black-
out mode” (O’Neill, 2018) with regard to the GCM. It is
alleged that “the media and political establishment so
far have refused to inform or consult with the…people”
(Gormally, 2018). In addition, it is alleged that the GCM
prohibits criticism of migration (“under this pact, stories
like this will be banned”; Shields, 2018). These findings
support the thesis of Canovan (1999, p. 3), who states
that populism not only challenges political actors but
also those actors, who allegedly disseminate elite val-
ues against the will and the basic interests of the peo-
ple. Moreover, toying with the human fear of the un-
known and the stranger is detected. One author writes
that by signing the GCM “#ISIS terrorists” (Walters, 2018)
will be imported and another that it “could extinguish”
(Tenacious, 2018) the identity of his country. The GCM
is also described as a possible threat to the sovereignty
of the people and as a compact that “dictate(s) immi-
gration policy and removes sovereignty” (Greine, 2018),
as well as a contract that gives “control of our borders
and sovereignty to a corrupt unelected bureaucracy”
(Orchard, 2018). The two right-wing populist tweets con-
tain as additional elements anti-migration strategies (see
Table 3 in the Supplementary File), namely the (implicit)
description of migrants as “non-citizens” (Shields, 2018),
welfare recipients and “terrorists” (Walters, 2018). Those
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Figure 2. Share of all (right-wing) populist tweets and all populist communication strategies among the widest-reaching
tweets (N = 500 tweets).
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 73–83 78
tweets indicate that there has indeed been a populist
“campaign to save the country” (Canovan, 1999, p. 6).
Yet, it needs to be stressed (again) that not many
tweets were found that contained at least two populist
statements representing at least two different core di-
mensions of populism and almost none that addition-
ally contained at least one anti-migration statement—
as already mentioned. However, it is interesting to note
that 13.6 percent of the tweets analysed contain at least
one populist sub-category and thereby a soft form of
populism, as Mazzoleni and Bracciale (2018, p. 7) have
called social media messages with “only one populist ref-
erence.” This finding is in line with the finding of Ernst
et al. (2017) who found slightly more than ten percent
of their social media sample contained at least one pop-
ulist reference.
The results of an automated analysis of the most fre-
quently used word-pairs in the overall sample of almost
70,000 tweets support the result of the manual exami-
nation of the sub-sample (N = 14,566 tweets), because
no word-pair was found that would have indicated that
the discourse on migration was strongly permeated by
populist narratives (see Table 4 in the Supplementary
File). Yet, the results indicate that the Twitter discourse
on migration during the signing conference was predom-
inantly critical against the compact, since the fifth, sixth,
and seventh-most frequently used word pairs refer to a
video of demonstrators against the GCM in Brussels—
one of the most popular tweets in the sample (Figure 3).
Furthermore, the word pair ‘protest rt’ occurs among
the top 10 word-pairs, indicating that tweets showing
protest against the GCM occur very frequently (rt means
‘re-tweet’).
Examining the Twitter profiles of the senders of the
12 populists’ tweets, it seems like those users are ordi-
nary citizens (see Tables 2 and 3 in the Supplementary
File). Among other indicators (no obvious affiliation to
a certain political party; no self-description as being a
politician etc.) the moderate number of followers (range:
144–6,565) supports the assumption that we are indeed
referring to normal citizens and not famous people or
well-known professional politicians. This observation is
interesting, as it indicates that ordinary citizens can be
quite influential on social media.Moreover, it shows that
populist communication in the digital sphere needs not
to be the exclusive domain of professional politicians
or political organizations, but also the matter of ordi-
nary citizens. Yet, one has to recognize that those ordi-
nary citizens did not create their own content but re-
tweeted that of other users. Interestingly, 5 of the 12
populist tweets were initially created by ordinary citi-
zens. Furthermore, the tweets of professional political ac-
tors, such as the leader of the UK Independence Party in
Wales, were more re-tweeted and favorited than those
of normal citizens. Nevertheless, it is striking to find pop-
ulist tweets from ordinary citizens that were dissemi-
nated with the help of other ordinary citizens. Those
non–professional actors seem to act as important dis-
seminators for populist content and as creators of pop-
ulist narratives. Almost the same is true in case of the
two right-wing populist tweets. Both were created by
non-elite actors with a rather low number of followers
and both were re-tweets. However, the re-tweeted users
were no ordinary citizens but a (former) Irish journalist
and a nationalist party from Canada.
Figure 3. Tweet with a video of demonstrators against the GCM. Source: BasedPoland (2018).
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6. Conclusion
In light of the aforementioned results, the remarkable
and maybe surprising result is that the Twitter discourse
onmigration during the period of the signing conference
on the GCMhas not been dominated by (right-wing) pop-
ulist narratives (RQ1). Although the debate on the GCM
must be seen as predominately critical against the com-
pact in general and against migration in particular, only
very few (right-wing) populist tweets were found among
the most popular tweets. Yet, it is interesting to note
that most of the few (right-wing) populist tweets contain
anti-elitist and people-centrist statements. It seems like
those dimensions are, as previous work has already in-
dicated, the most important ones in the realm of online
populist communication (RQ2). The populist (re-)tweets
identified were published by ordinary citizens and not by
professional politicians. Furthermore, half of the populist
tweets were initially created by other ordinary citizens.
Yet, one-third of the populist tweets identified were orig-
inally created by professional political actors, indicating
that ordinary citizens also seem to be very important dis-
seminators of (right-wing) populist content created by
professional politicians.
Finding populist content among the widest-reaching
tweets demonstrates that while the populist penetra-
tion of the discourse on migration on social media might
be less strong than expected, professional, as well as
non-professional populist actors might influence the at-
titudes of a large number of people. We have to keep in
mind that tweets might create populist attitudes among
their recipients (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017, p. 1437).
Moreover, journalists looking for a good story (Chadwick,
2017) might have used those few (right-wing) populist
tweets to indicate a larger critical assessment of theGCM
on social media. Thus, even when the empirical results
reveal only a few populist contents and even when some
of this content might be created by bots or trolls, this
content might have been very influential. Interestingly,
the findings indicate that populist online activism goes
beyond the organized groups, movements, etc., of civil
society. We might face a new type of political activism
making use of the social web to spread (right-wing) pop-
ulist narratives that do not match the assumptions be-
ing made in the concept of the public sphere in terms
of an alleged civil character. It follows that social media
indeed seems to provide free access for the citizenship
and thus the opportunity to participate in political issues,
such as in the case of the GCM. However, such kind of
populist participation can hardly be seen as enriching the
public sphere, but rather as an element of its corruption.
This finding is in line with previous empirical work on the
role of social media for the concept of the public sphere
(Kruse et al., 2018, p. 82).
Yet, it needs to be emphasized that the presented
findings are limited to Twitter. Against the empirical
data presented by Ernst et al. (2017, p. 1357), one
might assume that the migration dialogue on Facebook
is penetrated to a greater degree by populist statements.
Unfortunately (at least from a scientific point of view),
Facebook has shut downmost parts of its application pro-
gramming interface. Thus, it is virtually impossible to de-
termine whether the presented findings are also true for
the migration discourse on Facebook. One option would
be the (re-)examination of already queried Facebook
data under the aspects of this article. Furthermore, there
is a huge research gap in the usage of other social me-
dia tools than Twitter and Facebook by populist actors,
such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram. In partic-
ular, Telegram and WhatsApp seem to be interesting
cases, as it has already been shown that those tools
were extensively (mis)used by right-wing actors (Davis &
Straubhaar, 2020; Urman & Katz, 2020).
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